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Abstract
This paper uses count and binary data models with an endogenous
dummy variable to evaluate the effect of the subsidized health care pro-
gram in Medellin (Colombia). The subsidized program, which primarily
covers poor people, is found to have a significant impact on the use of pre-
ventive medical care and hospitalization that might have a negative im-
pact on the financial statements of the program. Specifically, econometric
estimations of health care utilization indicate that there is both selection
and moral hazard. These facts imply that the program can improve its
coverage if mechanisms are created to lower the individual moral hazard
effect.
Keywords: Binary Models; Count Models; Endogenous Dummy Regres-
sion; Program Evaluation.
Resumo
Este trabalho utiliza modelos de dados binários e de contagem com
uma variável indicadora endógena para avaliar o efeito do programa de
saúde em Medellín (Colômbia). Encontrou-se um impacto significativo
do programa subsidiado, que abrange principalmente a população pobre,
sobre o uso de assistência médica preventiva e de internação, o que pode
ter um impacto negativo sobre as situações financeiras do programa. Espe-
cificamente, estimativas econométricas da utilização de cuidados de saúde
indicam que há seleção e risco moral. Esses fatos sugerem que o programa
pode melhorar sua cobertura se forem criados mecanismos para diminuir
o efeito de risco moral individual.
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1 Introduction
Health care utilization and health insurance are intimately related because of
moral hazard and self selection. The demand for health care is conditioned
by the health insurance status of the user. However, the insurance decision
itself depends upon the expected future use of health services Cameron et al.
(1988). Specifically, the subsidized health insurance program reduces the ef-
fective price of medical care; this may lead to “overutilization” by the insured
users. Additionally, the future use of health services may induce people to en-
roll in the subsidized health insurance program. This phenomenon is known
as simultaneous equation bias or endogeneity bias. The problem is that the
error term of the medical care utilization is correlated with a dummy vari-
able that determines the participation in the program. In order to take into
account simultaneity, we use count and binary models based on Full Informa-
tion Maximum Likelihood that accommodate endogeneity due to self selec-
tion associated with treatment effects (Amemiya 1978, Terza 1998).
Recently, a great effort has been made to provide basic health care insur-
ance to the poor in developing countries. In Colombia, the Philippines and
Vietnam, for example, the poor are enrolled in a national social health insur-
ance scheme, which is financed by taxpayers. In China and Mexico, by con-
trast, households not covered by formal sector programs have the option of
enrolling in a separate subsidized public health insurance program Wagstaff
et al. (2007). However, the potential gains, because of distributional effects,
can be lost due to efficiency losses caused by distortion in users’ behavior as-
sociated with moral hazard and self selection. As a result, policy makers have
to evaluate the programs in order to identify problems with their implemen-
tation.
Evaluations of subsidized health insurance programs in developing coun-
tries are generally based on propensity score matching Saadah et al. (2001),
Trujillo et al. (2005), Urdinola & Jain (2006), Wagstaff (2007), Wagstaff et al.
(2007), Pita et al. (2008). The empirical evidence based on propensity score
matching indicates that subsidized health insurance programs have resulted
in a net increase in utilization for the poor beneficiaries. Nevertheless, the
level of health care utilization remains low in developing countries. However,
matching estimators of treatment effects are useful when the process of selec-
tion in treatment is based on observable variables, i.e., the key assumption
is that unobservable variables play no role in the treatment assignment and
outcomes determination. This is known as conditional independence assump-
tion Cameron & Trivedi (2005). If the conditional independence assumption
is not met, the estimated treatment effect is biased and inconsistent. In recent
years, instrumental variable methods have been advocated in order to account
for unobserved confounding variables, i.e., endogeneity problems. Specifi-
cally for the Colombian case, Trujillo et al. (2005) and Gaviria et al. (2006)
used instrumental variable methods; they found that the subsidized insur-
ance program greatly increased medical care utilization among the country’s
poor. However,
“. . . Despite the substantial increase in public expenditure on
health care and the increase in the proportion of population with
health insurance, many problems persist. On the one hand, the
implantation of a scheme of subsidies to demand has not been ac-
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companied by a dismantling of subsidies to supply, which has led
to a doubling in expenditure and amultiplication of inefficiencies.”
Gaviria et al. (2006, p. 4)
These structural problems recently caused the Colombian government to
declare a social emergency because of the health care system going bankrupt.
This paper evaluates the impact of Colombia’s subsidized health insurance
program on preventive health care utilization and hospitalization services of
Medellin’s citizens, and it attempts to contribute to the more general litera-
ture on the impact of subsidized health insurance programs implanted in de-
veloping countries. In particular, we use Poisson and Binary models that take
into account endogeneity due to unobserved characteristics. Our economet-
ric estimations of health care utilization indicate that there is both selection
and moral hazard. These phenomena invalidate the evaluation of subsidized
health programs based on propensity score matching, which is the most popu-
lar technique used in these circumstances. Specifically, it is found that people
enrolled in this subsidized program visit less frequently a doctor compared
with uncovered individuals. On the other hand, covered people have a higher
probability of hospitalization than individuals who are not in this program.
This result has bad consequences for financial statements of the subsidized
health care program.
The paper is organized as follows. The first section provides a review of the
Colombian health care systems. The methodology used to evaluate the impact
of the subsidized health insurance on the poor in Colombia is sketched out in
section two. Section three presents the evaluation results of the subsidized
health care program in Medellin city, and finally, we show some concluding
remarks.
2 Colombian health care systems
Up until the 80s, the Colombian health care system was based on three sep-
arate schemes: the private scheme, which provided health services to the
wealthiest segment of the population through private health insurance plans;
the public scheme, which had the task of providing health services to the
poorest part of the population who were not protected by medical insurance;
and the social security scheme, which aimed to provide basic health services
to two different groups of the population, the formal workers belonging to
the private sector through the Social Security Institute (Instituto de Seguri-
dad Social) and the public sector workers through the Social Benefit Societies
(Cajas de Previsión Social). This health care system had its boom between
1975 and 1984 but fell into decay after that due to the fiscal crisis during
1984 that reduced the contributions assigned to this sector. Despite the afore-
mentioned boom, the system never achieved near acceptable goals, mainly
because inequalities persisted (both between regions and strata), low levels of
insurance coverage and a high inefficiency in the public provision of health
services Gaviria et al. (2006).
During the first half of the 1990s, the Colombian government carried out
profound reforms in health care system that reduced its participation in the
industry. This allowed for regulated competition among private firms, sepa-
rated the provision of health insurance from supplying health services, and
decentralized subsidized programs for the local governments. The schemes
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that arose out of these reforms are a contributory social insurance program fi-
nanced by mandatory taxes, and a subsidized program aimed at covering the
lowest income and the most vulnerable of the population, financed by both
local and central government resources. These reforms were based on five
principles, according to the 1993 Law 100: efficiency, universality, solidarity,
integrity and participation, which tried to achieve four objectives: increase
coverage, increase solidarity through cross subsidies from the contributive to
the subsidized program, improve efficiency by allowing competition in the
industry and changing the supply side subsidies to demand side subsidies
Congress (1993).
The new health system required people affiliated to the contributive pro-
gram to pay 12% of their income (two thirds paid by the employer and one
third by the employee), collected by an insurer chosen by the employee. The
subsidized program is financed by a constant percentage of the aforemen-
tioned contribution, transfers from the central government and resources ow-
ned by the local governments and regional entities. The municipalities are
responsible for identifying the beneficiaries of the subsidized program, who
pay a coinsurance rate in order to rationalize the use of medical services. Ad-
ditionally, there is still a supply side subsidy paid to ESS (Empresas Solidarias
de Salud), which are nonprofit medical care providers.
Compared to the reform’s explicit objectives that led to the actual health
care system, this has not been successful. It has targeting problems, due to a
significant number of low income households which do not receive the bene-
fits from the subsidized program when some high income families do. This
happens because of imperfect monitoring, corruption and limitations in ad-
ministrative capabilities to identify plausible beneficiaries. It also has cover-
age problems because of the slow growth of people in the contributive pro-
gram, transfers from the central government and contributions from the re-
gional entities Gaviria et al. (2006). Additionally, the transition of supply side
to demand side subsidies is still incomplete, maintaining inefficiencies due to
public hospitals which are not capable of selling services, thus displaying a
structural deficit in their budget. Along with this, the introduction of the sub-
sidized program has led to a growth in the number of public hospitals which
lower the levels of occupation, resulting in an underuse of these facilities. The
biggest problem of the failure to make the transition between supply side to
demand side subsidies is that the first extracts resources from the latter.
3 Methodology
The basis for evaluating programs is the counterfactual analysis where an out-
come is observed for all individuals but in different states. Specifically, we
consider a model in which health care utilization is observed for all individ-
uals, but in only one of the two possible states; covered or uncovered by the
subsidized program. Individuals self select into a given program due to ex-
pected future use of preventive care and hospitalization might affect the de-
cision to enroll in the scheme, this phenomenon has the potential for causing
endogeneity. Given that our measures of health care utilization are number of
preventive visits and hospitalization, we must specify statistical models that
have the same support as our dependent variables, specifically count and bi-
nary responses, respectively. Therefore, we use Poisson and Binary models
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where self selection due to unobserved characteristics is being additionally
taken into consideration. Specifically, we use the methodology developed by
Terza (1998) and Miranda (2004) in the case of number of preventive doc-
tor visits, and we apply the procedures proposed by Amemiya (1978), Green
(2003) and Miranda & Rabe-Hesketch (2006) which account for endogeneity
in binary response models, which is the case in hospitalization.
Regarding the number of preventive visits, we follow the discussion of
Terza (1998) and Miranda (2004) where the ith individual is considered from
a random sample I = {1,2, . . . ,N } whose dependent variable is the number of
preventive visits to the doctor in the last year (yi = 0,1, . . . ). The conditional
probability density function of the count dependent variable is Poisson whose
mean equals to Exp{x′iβ+diγ+ei }. This one depends on a vector of explanatory
variables xi , a binary switching variable (di = 0,1) which indicates the state of
ith individual, covered or uncovered by the subsidized health insurance pro-
gram, and a random component ei that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity.
Given a vector of explanatory variables zi (which may contain some or all the
elements of xi ), di is characterized by an index process
di =

1, z′iα + vi > 0
0, z′iα + vi 6 0
(1)
Suppose that ei and vi are jointly Normal,[
ei
vi
]
∼N
([
0
0
]
,
[
σ2 σρ
σρ 1
])
(2)
where ρ accounts for correlation between the response variable and the treat-
ment indicator.
After some algebra and given a change of variable ηi = ei/σ
√
2, the joint
conditional probability density function of yi and di , given xi and zi , may be
expressed as
f (yi ,di |zi ,xi ) =
1√
π
∫ ∞
−∞
f (yi |zi ,xi ,di ,
√
2σηi )

diΦ
∗
i (
√
2σηi )+
(1− di )(1−Φ∗i {
√
2σηi })
Exp{−η2i }dηi (3)
where f
(
yi |zi ,xi ,di ,
√
2σηi
)
is the conditional probability density function of
yi given zi , xi , di and ei ; Φ(.) is the cumulative distribution function of a Nor-
mal standard variable; and Φ∗i
(√
2σηi
)
= Φ
(
z′iα+(ρ
√
2ηi)√
1−ρ2
)
. Once f (yi |zi ,xi ,di ,
√
2σηi
)
is specified, the log-likelihood function for a sample of size N can be
established.
In the Poisson version of the model
f (yi |zi ,xi ,di ,
√
2σηi ) =
{Exp{x′iβ +γdi +
√
2σηi }}yi Exp{−Exp{x′iβ +γdi +
√
2σηi }}
yi !
(4)
Notice that the mean and variance of the count variable are
µi = E[yi |di , zi ,xi ] = Exp{x′iβ +γdi −0.5σ}
(
di
Φ(z′iα +σρ)
Φ(z′iα)
+ (1− di )
1−Φ(z′iα +σρ)
1−Φ(z′iα)
)
(5)
and
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Var (yi |di , zi ,xi ) = µi + kµ2i (6)
where k = Exp
(
2σ2
)
−Exp
(
σ2
)
. Thus, the model exhibits overdispersion.
If it is assumed that there is no impact through the interaction effects with
observed characteristics, and there are just effects due to being enrolled in
the subsidized program and unobserved drivers because of self selection, the
impact of the health care program can be measured by the following equation
Maddala (1996).
E [yi |zi ,xi ,di = 1]
E [yi |zi ,xi ,di = 0]
= Exp {γ}

Φ
(
z′iα +σρ
)
Φ
(
z′iα
)


1−Φ
(
z′iα
)
1−Φ
(
z′iα +σρ
)
 (7)
where Exp {γ}measures the moral hazard effect and (Φ(z
′
iα+σρ)
Φ(z′iα)
)(
1−Φ(z′iα)
1−Φ(z′iα+σρ)
) is
the selection effect based on unobservable factors.
If ρ = 0, ei and vi are independent, then di is an exogenous process, that
is, there is no self selection under this formulation. Thus, the parameter esti-
mates in an exogenous count model are unbiased and consistent. This model
is identified through nonlinear functional form even if all the variables in the
insurance equation are included in the utilization equation. However, we use
exclusion restrictions to identify parameter estimates.
In the case of hospitalization, we follow the discussion of Amemiya (1978),
Green (2003) and Miranda & Rabe-Hesketch (2006), where yi = {0,1} is a di-
chotomous variable which is equal to 1 if individual i was hospitalized in the
last year. The model can be formulated as a system of equations for two la-
tent variables
(
y∗i and d
∗
i
)
. The process for di is characterized by equation (1),
where d∗i = z
′
iα + vi and yi is generated by
yi =

1, y∗i = x
′
iβ + diγ + ei > 0
0, y∗i = x
′
iβ + diγ + ei 6 0
(8)
where vi = ǫi + ui and ei = λǫi + τi . Here, ǫi , ui and τi are distributed normal
standard. Therefore,
[
ei
vi
]
∼N
([
0
0
]
,
[
λ2 +1 λ
λ 2
])
(9)
Thus, ρ = λ√
2(λ2+1)
.
If λ = 0, which implies ρ = 0, there is not self selection under this formu-
lation, and the parameter estimates in a univariate Probit model are unbiased
and consistent.
Again, the semi-structural model is identified, but we introduce exclusion
restrictions to identify parameter estimates.
4 Econometric Results
The subsidized health care program is targeted to poor households that ac-
complish some specific requirements. Specifically, they must be classified in
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level one or two in the SISBEN,1 and stratum one, two or three.2 Additionally,
all members of the household have to be unemployed.
We estimate our models using data from the Medellin Living Standards
Survey in 2007. This is a cross-section representative survey of the non-institu-
tionalized population inMedellin with excellent information on demographic
and socioeconomic characteristics and health status. Out of a sample of 12,975
individuals that can freely choose to be in the subsidized program, 9,893 of
them are in the program, that is 76.24% of the sample. As can be seen in Table
1, there is no statistical difference in the unconditional mean of the amount of
preventive medical care utilization. The average number of visits is 2.45 and
2.49 for uncovered and covered individuals. On the other hand, the level of
hospitalization of the former is 2%, while the latter is 3%. This implies that
there is statistical difference in the level of hospitalization. In general, there
are statistical differences between these groups. In particular, individuals in-
volved in the program are older, there is a higher proportion of women, they
have a lower level of education, their perception of health status is better in
low levels and most of them are in stratum one and two.
Table 2 shows that 14.91% of the individuals did not visit a doctor for
preventive purposes. Additionally, the cumulative relative frequency until
four visits is 98.4%. The highest frequency is observed at four visits whose
percentage is 36.31%. Probably, there is unconditional overdispersion in data
because of the long right tail (the maximum number of preventive care visits
is 64) and the unconditional variance is 3.63, which is greater than the mean
that is 2.48.
We estimate count and binary models with endogenous switching where
the former variable is the number of preventive medical care visits and the lat-
ter is a dummy indicator of hospitalization, both in the last year. The switch-
ing variable is to belong to the subsidized program. It must be taken into
consideration that these semi-structural models are identified through non-
linear functional forms, even if all the variables in the insurance equation are
included in the utilization equations. However, given an initial specification
with same controls in utilization and participation equations, specifically, we
control by age, gender, level of education, own perceived health status and
strata, we sequentially eliminate variables that were not statistically signifi-
cant at 5% in each equation. Therefore, we use traditional exclusion restric-
tions to identify parameter estimates. Additionally, this procedure generates
more efficient estimators.
As can be seen in Table 3, one of the most relevant characteristics in the
Poisson count model is that there is a statistical significant correlation be-
tween unobserved factors that affect preventive health care utilization and
subsidized program, as we can see that ρ is different from zero. Therefore,
there is self selection, and individuals that hope to visit more frequently a
doctor also show a higher probability of being in the program. Omitting this
phenomenon implies biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. Addition-
ally, we can observe from this table that there is evidence that overdispersion
is present because of the fact that σ is statistically significant at 5%.
1SISBEN is a survey whose main objective is to identify and classify households that can
obtain some governmental benefits.
2Households in Colombia are classified by strata. This is done in order to give subsidies
associated with utility consumption to poor people who are classified in low strata. On the other
hand, households that are classified in high strata must pay some contributions.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable No Subsidized
Regimen
Subsidized
Regimen
Mean Hypothesis Test1
Number Preventive Visits 2.45
(2.17)
2.49
(1.82)
− 0.99
Hospitalization 0.02
(0.16)
0.03
(0.18)
− 2.42∗
Age 25.96
(21.29)
32.37
(17.43)
−16.85∗
Female 0.45
(0.50)
0.59
(0.49)
−13.56∗
No Education 0.31
(0.46)
0.39
(0.49)
− 7.94∗
Primary 0.41
(0.49)
0.40
(0.49)
1.04
High School 0.25
(0.43)
0.20
(0.40)
5.82∗
Vocational 0.01
(0.12)
0.01
(0.09)
2.49∗
University 0.01
(0.06)
0.00
(0.11)
4.23∗
Bad Health Status 0.01
(0.08)
0.02
(0.13)
− 5.46∗
Fair Health Status 0.07
(0.26)
0.13
(0.33)
− 9.49∗
Good Health Status 0.83
(0.38)
0.77
(0.42)
6.90∗
Excellent Health Status 0.09
(0.29)
0.08
(0.28)
1.64
Stratum 1 0.24
(0.43)
0.26
(0.44)
− 2.95∗
Stratum 2 0.52
(0.50)
0.66
(0.47)
−13.80∗
Stratum 3 0.24
(0.43)
0.08
(0.26)
20.41∗
1Null hypothesis: means are equal. Critical value at 5% level of significance is 1.96.
* Rejection of null hypothesis at 5% significance level.
Standard Deviation in parenthesis.
Source: Authors’ estimations.
Table 2: Preventive Health Care Visits: Observed Fre-
quencies
Medical appointments per year Percent Frequency
0 14.91 1935
1 21.87 2837
2 9.56 1241
3 15.75 2043
4 36.31 4711
More than 4 1.60 208
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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We can observe from Table 3 that older individuals visit more frequently a
doctor but at a decreasing rate. Additionally, the number of visits are higher
in people from stratum two compared with stratum one, but it is lower in stra-
tum three. Individuals whose maximum level of education is primary do not
have statistical difference compared with individuals without education, indi-
viduals whose education level is high school or university and that visit less
frequently a doctor, but those whose maximum achievement education level
is vocational do more preventive health care visits. Regarding self perceived
health status, the base category is bad condition, and it can be seen from Table
3 that individuals whose health status is fair visit less frequently a health care
center.
As we can see in tables 3 and 4, older women show a higher probability of
being in the subsidized health care program, individuals in stratum two have
a higher propensity compared with people in stratum one, on the other hand
individuals in stratum three have a lower propensity. Regarding the level of
education, the base category is no education, and we can observe that a higher
education achievement implies a lower probability of being in the program.
Finally, individuals whose self health perception is bad or fair show a higher
probability of being enrolled.
It can be observed in Table 3 that moral hazard due to being in the sub-
sidized program is −21% = Exp{−0.23} − 1, and the mean self selection effect
is 1.28 with a 95% confidence interval equal to (1.24,1.37) (see equation 7).
These values imply that individuals who are involved in the program visit a
doctor 21% less frequently for preventive health care purposes than individu-
als who are not in this program. We apply the two-stage nonlinear method of
moments developed by Terza (1998) as robustness check. We basically get the
same outcomes with this methodology. However, it must be taken into consid-
eration that this procedure is less efficient than Full Information Maximum
Likelihood. See Annex, Table A.1.
In order to evaluate the effects of the subsidized health care program on
hospitalization, we estimate an endogenous switching Probit model. As Table
4 illustrates, there is self selection due to ρ being statistically significant at
5%. Therefore, parameter estimators must take into consideration this fact to
avoid bias and inconsistency problems. We can see in this table that individu-
als from stratum three and whose self health perception is bad have a higher
rate of hospitalization.
Additionally, we can see in Table 4 that the subsidized health care program
has a statistically significant effect on hospitalization. Specifically, there is a
positive effect, which means that individuals enrolled in this program have
a higher probability of hospitalization. For instance, a person enrolled in the
programwho is from stratum two andwhose self perception of health status is
good has a probability of 3.28%; whereas a person with these characteristics
but who is not enrolled in the health subsidized program has a probability
of 0.48%. We estimate an endogenous switching Logit model as robustness
check, and we obtain similar results. See Annex,Table A.2.
5 Conclusions
Parameter estimates indicate that there is self selection, this fact implies that
conventional techniques to evaluate public programs based on propensity
552 Hassan, Jiménez and Montoya Economia Aplicada, v.17, n.4
Table 3: Endogenous Poisson Model: Preventive Health Care
Variable Coefficient Standard Deviation z Statistic
Number of visits
Subsidized Regimen −0.232 0.052 −4.480
Age 0.011 0.001 8.400
Squared Age −0.0001 0.00001 −8.400
Stratum 2 0.044 0.015 2.920
Stratum 3 −0.167 0.027 −6.080
Primary 0.019 0.016 1.160
High School −0.106 0.020 −5.290
Vocational 0.132 0.062 2.130
University −0.197 0.087 −2.270
Fair Health Status −0.113 0.057 −1.990
Good Health Status −0.105 0.055 −1.920
Excellent Health Status 0.050 0.058 0.860
Constant 0.983 0.072 13.690
Subsidized Regimen
Age*Female 0.014 0.001 20.610
Stratum 2 0.080 0.030 2.690
Stratum 3 −0.807 0.042 −19.310
Primary −0.196 0.030 − 6.650
High School −0.267 0.034 − 7.790
Vocational −0.466 0.118 − 3.970
University −0.845 0.145 − 5.850
Fair Health Status −0.270 0.141 − 1.910
Good Health Status −0.453 0.136 − 3.340
Excellent Health Status −0.431 0.141 − 3.050
Constant 1.143 0.137 8.320
σ 0.356 0.009 37.920
ρ 0.388 0.077 5.070
Source: Authors’ estimations.
score matching obtain wrong outcomes, while endogenous models take into
consideration this phenomenon, which implies unbiased and consistent esti-
mates under the assumption of good statistical specification.
Regarding preventive health care utilization, it is found that people en-
rolled in this subsidized program visit less frequently a doctor compared with
uncovered individuals. On the other hand, covered people have a higher
probability of hospitalization than individuals who are not in this program.
This result has bad consequences for financial statements of the subsidized
health care program in Medellin due to hospitalization being more expensive
than preventive services. Perhaps people involved in this program are less
concerned about preventive services because they know that hospitalization
services are not too expensive due to their situation. Therefore, our recom-
mendation is to implement a strategy that encourages preventive health care
utilization that mitigates possible negative effects on this program, and as a
consequence to widen its coverage.
Regarding future research and limitations, we must take into considera-
tion that although the endogenous Poisson model takes into account overdis-
persion, there is one limitation that has not been overtaken in this application,
the excess of zeros. To overcome this characteristic it is necessary to imple-
ment a Zero Inflated Poisson model with endogenous switching. Although
Greene (2008) develops a Zero Inflated Possion model with selection, we did
not find an econometric framework that takes into consideration endogenous
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Table 4: Endogenous Switching Binomial Probit Model: Hospitalization
Variable Coefficient Standard Deviation z Statistic
Hospitalization
Subsidized Regimen 0.745 0.167 4.450
Stratum 2 −0.088 0.050 −1.750
Stratum 3 0.197 0.091 2.180
Fair Health Status −0.470 0.112 −4.190
Good Health Status −1.121 0.127 −8.830
Excellent Health Status −0.993 0.144 −6.920
Constant −1.376 0.181 −7.610
Subsidized Regimen
Age*Female 0.014 0.001 20.350
Stratum 2 0.080 0.030 2.710
Stratum 3 −0.809 0.042 −19.490
Primary −0.192 0.029 − 6.550
High School −0.263 0.034 − 7.680
Vocational −0.438 0.122 − 3.590
University −0.857 0.144 − 5.960
Fair Health Status −0.237 0.138 − 1.720
Good Health Status −0.421 0.132 − 3.200
Excellent Health Status −0.400 0.138 − 2.910
Constant 1.110 0.133 8.340
ρ −0.450 0.103 − 4.360
Source: Authors’ estimations.
switching.
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Appendix A
Table A.1: Two Stage Method of Moments: Preventive Health Care
Variable Coefficient Standard Deviation z Statistic
Number of visits
Subsidized Regimen −0.168 0.141 −1.190
Age 0.010 0.001 7.390
Squared Age −0.0001 0.0000 −7.260
Stratum 2 0.042 0.016 2.690
Stratum 3 −0.136 0.047 −2.890
Primary 0.023 0.018 1.290
High School −0.097 0.024 −4.080
Vocational 0.135 0.069 1.950
University −0.177 0.080 −2.210
Fair Health Status −0.150 0.100 −1.500
Good Health Status −0.146 0.099 −1.470
Excellent Health Status 0.002 0.100 0.020
Constant 1.038 0.163 6.360
Subsidized Regimen
Age*Female 0.014 0.001 20.460
Stratum 2 0.081 0.030 2.730
Stratum 3 −0.809 0.042 −19.340
Primary −0.193 0.030 −6.530
High School −0.270 0.034 −7.870
Vocational −0.450 0.119 −3.790
University −0.846 0.145 −5.830
Fair Health Status −0.269 0.142 −1.890
Good Health Status −0.445 0.137 −3.250
Excellent Health Status −0.424 0.142 −2.980
Constant 1.136 0.138 8.210
θ 0.099 0.086 1.150
Source: Authors’ estimations.
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Table A.2: Endogenous Switching Binomial Logit Model: Hospitalization
Variable Coefficient Standard Deviation z Statistic
Hospitalization
Subsidized Regimen 0.860 0.066 12.940
Stratum 2 −0.099 0.059 − 1.670
Stratum 3 0.220 0.092 2.400
Fair Health Status −0.479 0.155 − 3.090
Good Health Status −1.191 0.337 − 3.530
Excellent Health Status −1.040 −0.310 − 3.360
Constant −1.483 0.152 − 9.770
Subsidized Regimen
Age*Female 0.014 0.001 20.250
Stratum 2 0.080 0.030 2.710
Stratum 3 −0.809 0.042 −19.480
Primary −0.192 0.029 − 6.540
High School −0.263 0.034 − 7.630
Vocational −0.437 0.122 − 3.570
University −0.857 0.144 − 5.970
Fair Health Status −0.233 0.137 − 1.700
Good Health Status −0.418 0.131 − 3.200
Excellent Health Status −0.398 0.137 − 2.900
Constant 1.108 0.133 8.360
ρ −0.498 0.103 − 4.850
Source: Authors’ estimations.
